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Advertising Expensive Mortgages
Umit G. Gurun,a Gregor Matvosb and Amit Serub
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ABSTRACT
We use a unique dataset that combines information on advertising and mortgages originated by
subprime lenders to study whether advertising helped consumers find cheaper mortgages.
Lenders who advertise more within a region sell more expensive mortgages, measured as the
excess rate of a mortgage after accounting for a broad set of borrower, contract, and regional
characteristics. These effects are stronger for mortgages sold to less sophisticated consumers. We
exploit variation in mortgage advertising induced by the entry of Craigslist across different
regions as well as a battery of other tests to demonstrate that the relation between advertising and
mortgage expensiveness is not spurious. Our estimates imply that consumers pay on average
$7,500 more when borrowing from a lender who advertises. Analyzing advertising content
reveals that initial/introductory rates are advertised frequently in a salient fashion in contrast to
reset rates, which are rarely advertised. Moreover, the advertised price (APR) is at best
uncorrelated with mortgage expensiveness. Our facts reject the canonical models of informative
advertising and are instead more consistent with persuasion models, in which the reset rate is
shrouded/not salient and advertising is used steer unsophisticated consumers into bad choices by
increasing the salience of the initial interest rate.
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I. Introduction
Recent literature shows the importance of search in the mortgage market (Hall and Woodward
2012). Although mortgages are relatively homogeneous products, search frictions create a
demand for information about mortgages that lenders can cater to. There are two broad views on
how lenders use advertising to supply this information to consumers. On the one hand, the
“informative view” claims that advertising allows consumers to find better products (Nelson
1974). On the other hand, the “persuasive view” suggests that advertising is used to steer
consumers into bad choices (Braithwaite 1928; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). These views are at
the center of a vociferous debate regarding the role of advertising in the mortgage market in the
aftermath of the housing crisis. Several policy and regulatory changes that have emerged from
these discussions are based on the idea that naïve consumers were duped by advertising to enter
expensive mortgages. 1 While anecdotes have been used to justify these claims of deceptive
advertising, there is no empirical study that has systematically investigated this issue. 2
This paper has two goals. The main goal is to provide evidence for deceptive advertising using
unique micro data on lending and advertising from the subprime mortgage market. Having found
such evidence, the second goal is to compare the performance of a rich set of models of
advertising in explaining the data and to show that our facts reject the canonical models of
informative advertising.
Our dataset combines the intensity and content of local advertising by subprime lenders with the
contract, region, and borrower characteristics of mortgages originated by them. We focus on
adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) loans, and in particular ARM reset rates, because they have
been at the center of lawsuits and regulatory scrutiny. The scrutiny is based on the idea that
advertising lures consumers into bad choices by focusing their attention on the introductory
interest rate, fostering the impression that the (low) rate will be permanent, rather than reset after
the first few years.
We empirically confirm the perception that reset rates are “hidden” characteristics of advertised
mortgages. In the 37,432 mortgage campaigns in print and direct mail that we analyze, only
seven (0.02%) explicitly mention a reset rate. While this result indicates persuasive advertising
1

Regulators have penalized lenders for deceptive practices and implemented explicit regulation of mortgage
advertising. The FDIC implemented Regulation Z in 2008 and the FTC passed the Mortgage Acts and Practices
Advertising rule in 2011, both of which directly regulate advertising of mortgages. The New York Times
summarized this prevailing view: “One of the most important lessons of the mortgage collapse is that potential
borrowers need clear explanations of exactly what kind of commitment they are making” (October 1, 2010). The
Fed fined Wells Fargo $85 million for steering consumers into expensive mortgages, and the Department of Justice
reached a $175 million settlement with Wells Fargo to resolve fair lending claims
(http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-dag-869.html) [accessed on February 29, 2013].
2
In general, lack of data has precluded research on advertising mortgage products (see Agarwal and Ambrose 2011)
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that shrouds reset rates, it is not sufficient to reject informative advertising. Just because reset
rates are not advertised does not imply that consumers are unaware of them and therefore make
worse choices than they should. The obvious difficulty in separating the informative and
persuasive views is that one needs to identify “better” and “worse” mortgages, and then relate the
choices of consumers, who may not be otherwise identical, to lender advertising.
We measure whether mortgages are relatively better or worse for the consumer by computing the
extent to which identical consumers pay different prices for otherwise similar mortgages in a
given market. We contend that cheaper mortgages, all else equal, are better products from the
perspective of the consumer. We exploit the richness of our data and measure the relative
“expensiveness” of a given mortgage as the excess reset rate of a mortgage after accounting for a
broad set of borrower, contract, and regional characteristics associated with a given mortgage,
including the initial interest rate. The essence of the relative expensiveness measure is that if
identical consumers obtain the same mortgage with different reset rates in the same market, then
the difference in the reset rates measures how much worse the choice of the consumer with the
higher reset rate was.
We find large differences in average reset rates charged by lenders within geographic regions
(designated market areas, or DMAs) after conditioning on borrower and loan characteristics and
the initial interest rate: the average difference between the 95th and 5th percentile lenders in a
given region is 2.8 percentage points. Thus, in the first part of our analysis we find that loans
originated by some lenders are, on average, more expensive than others.
Next, we show one of the central results of the paper, that there is a positive correlation between
lender expensiveness and advertising within a given market. Lenders who advertise more
intensively also charge more for the same mortgage. We then extensively address alternative
explanations to show our results are not spurious. In particular, we obtain our results by
exploiting the variation in relative advertising of lenders within a given location using lender
fixed effects. Thus, our finding is not driven by the simple notion that lenders advertise more in
regions with higher mortgage prices. In addition, exploiting within lenders variation allows us to
allay concerns that it is lender characteristics--such as the lender’s brand, other lenders’ activities
aimed at attracting customers, propensity to renegotiate or securitize, or marginal costs--which
may be correlated with advertising, that are driving the results.
Another potential alternative explanation is that advertising attracts a different pool of borrowers
who are charged higher reset rates due to their lower ability to repay or due to higher catering
costs. This alternative could explain our findings if true borrower “quality” is not captured by our
rich set of conditioning variables. We conduct two tests to explore this alternative. First, if
advertising lenders lend to borrowers who are less likely to repay a loan then we should find that
2

such borrowers are indeed less likely to repay a loan in the future. We find that advertisers lend
to consumers who, all else equal, default less, making it unlikely that our results are driven by
unobservable borrower quality. As well, using another unique dataset, we show that advertising
does not attract consumers with higher catering costs.
Second, we exploit variation in mortgage advertising induced by staggered entry of Craigslist
across different regions and times. We show that mortgage classifieds represent over 8% of all
financial services posts on Craigslist. Thus, Craigslist entry into a market serves as a potentially
viable source of variation in mortgage advertising in that market. Indeed, introduction of
Craigslist has a significant impact on paid mortgage advertising, with the highest impact on
newspaper advertising, for which Craigslist online classifieds substitute most directly. We
exploit this Craigslist-induced variation in changes in advertising between lenders and continue
to find a positive relationship between the intensity of local advertising and the expensiveness of
mortgages extended by lenders. 3 Importantly, Craigslist introduction is unrelated to borrowers’
characteristics in that region. Together, these results reaffirm that the explanation that advertising
attracts borrowers of different riskiness or catering costs is not likely driving our findings.
The magnitudes that we obtain from our analysis are large and suggest that a consumer who
obtains a mortgage from a lender who advertises pays on average approximately $7,440 more in
present-value terms. These estimates are on the same order of magnitude as the estimates of
losses faced by mortgage borrowers because they do not properly account for broker service fees
that are given in Hall and Woodward (2012).
Having established that there is a positive relationship between the expensiveness of a lender and
the advertising intensity by that lender within a market, we next compare the performance of a
set of rich models of advertising. Canonical models of informed advertising (e.g., Butters 1977;
Robert and Stahl 1993; Bagwell and Ramey 1994) cannot generate the positive correlation we
find. In these models lenders use costly advertising to inform consumers of low prices, so
cheaper lenders within a market would use this means to attract customers to their mortgages.
Therefore these models predict a negative (or no) relationship between lender expensiveness and
advertising. We bolster the argument against informative advertising by examining the content of
mortgage advertisements. We find that the correlation between advertised interest rates and
realized interest rates is at best zero, which violates the fundamental assumption of informative
advertising models that advertised prices are equal to transaction prices (e.g., Butters 1977;
Robert and Stahl 1993).
3

Our identification allows for a market-level increase in overall mortgage advertising, including advertising on
Craigslist, because we only exploit the differential change in paid advertising between lenders within a market.
Moreover, we show that lenders who decrease paid advertising upon Craigslist entry do not offset this advertising
decrease through an increase in advertising on Craigslist.
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Our results are more consistent with the persuasive view in which advertising causes consumers
to enter worse mortgages. Under this view, we should observe that advertising draws consumers
to relatively more expensive mortgages—those which contain higher reset rates, all else equal.
While there is no one model of persuasive advertising that can deliver all our findings, our
results are consistent with forces generated by several models. In particular, we find that reset
rates are almost never advertised, in contrast to introductory/initial interest rates. As well,
mortgage advertisements contain very little information on the characteristics of mortgages or
lenders. The models that are consistent with this feature of advertising are those in which some
characteristics of goods, in our case the reset rate, are shrouded/not salient (Gabaix and Laibson
2006, Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012) and advertising is used to increase the salience of
certain other characteristics, the initial interest rate in the case of mortgage advertising.
Moreover, the positive correlation between advertising intensity and pricing is driven by
mortgage advertisers who tilt their portfolio toward less-educated borrowers, minority borrowers,
and the poor--groups of borrowers identified in the literature as potentially less sophisticated
(Hall and Woodward 2012). Therefore, heterogeneity in the degree of consumer sophistication
also plays a central role in explaining the persuasive role in advertising.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II we discuss the institutional
background, including the anecdotal evidence on the deceptive and persuasive use of advertising
in mortgage markets. In Section III we present our data sources. Section IV outlines the
empirical results relating advertising intensity and mortgage pricing. Section V analyzes the
content of advertisements. Section VI discusses the findings, links them to models of advertising
and the related literature, and concludes
II. Institutional Background
Anecdotal evidence of persuasive and deceptive advertising in the mortgage market
As we discuss in detail in Section III, lenders target potential consumers through advertisements
in local newspapers, in television, radio, and outdoor spots. Several discussions in the popular
press as well as policy discussions suggest that mortgage lenders have employed advertising to
confuse consumers into making “bad” decisions. A Wall Street Journal article on February 15,
2005, describes a then-popular practice of advertising low teaser (initial) rates on ARMs as a
way to attract consumers who do not realize that these rates will be substantially higher after the
reset date. Consider four typical ARM advertisements, which we present in Appendix B (in
Section V we confirm that the features of these ads are indeed typical). They all prominently
state the introductory interest rate, making it the focal, salient part of the advertisement. None of
4

the advertisements mention the reset rate or the index that will be used at the time of reset. The
most informative advertisement is by the Pentagon Credit Union in the Washington Post on
August 5, 2006 (Appendix B.3). It states the annual percentage rate (APR) of 7.045% in addition
to the introductory rate of 5.625% for five years. Note that there is no mention of how the APR is
computed. 4
The advertisement presented in Appendix B.1 neglected even to mention that the mortgage is
adjustable and offered a “low introductory teaser interest rate” of 1%. According to the
settlement agreement between New York Banking Department and Sage Credit Company
(formerly named DCG Mortgage), this particular advertisement failed to “clearly and
conspicuously disclose the actual terms of repayment of the loans, including that the advertised
low interest rate and low monthly payments are subject to increase and do not last over the life of
the loan.”
Several high-profile lawsuits have been directed at lenders for using false advertising to attract
potential consumers and steer them into “bad” mortgages. The Office of the Attorney General’s
Consumer Protection Section in Colorado has sued or settled with sixteen mortgage lenders
regarding “deceptive advertising” by “unscrupulous brokers who were taking advantage of
borrowers. … Consumers often were surprised to learn that the fixed payment schedule they
believed they had signed up for actually resulted in … owing more than the original loan.” 5
Similar lawsuits were filed by the Arizona Office of Attorney General against Home Loan
Center for mortgages originated from 2004 to 2007 and against Wells Fargo Bank relating to
similar practices and advertising by Wachovia Corporation and Golden West Corporation (both
acquired by Wells Fargo).
The lawsuits against mortgage lenders frequently allege that these ads were targeted at
minorities, who are potentially more vulnerable to misinformation. For instance, in the lawsuit
against Countrywide Financial Corporation/Bank of America by the State of Illinois, the attorney
general found that Countrywide steered “prime-eligible” minority community borrowers into
high-fee subprime ARM loans relative to similarly situated white borrowers from 2005 to 2007.
In another high-profile example, class action documents filed in October 2012 by the ACLU
against Morgan Stanley state that the lender discriminated against “African Americans in the

4

In general, the APR is supposed to help consumers compare loans on equal terms. However, lenders’ APR policies
differ. Moreover, APRs may also vary depending on the size of the loan, whether it is adjustable or fixed, and on the
lenders’ requirements for mortgage and title insurance (see http://loan.yahoo.com/m/primer11.html; accessed on
March 4, 2013). According to regulation, the Official Staff Commentary to Regulation Z, Section 226.17 (c) (10)
determines how to compute the APR for adjustable loans.
5
http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/departments/consumer_protection/mortgage_fraud_information_center/lea
rn_more_about_attorney_general%E2%80%99 (accessed on Feb 29, 2013)
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Detroit, Michigan metropolitan area,” steering them into exceedingly high-cost and high-risk
residential mortgage loans. 6
Resulting Regulation
In response to concerns about unfair and deceptive mortgage lending and servicing practices, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System issued significant new mortgage lending
rules, Regulation Z, which took effect on October 1, 2009. Regulation Z includes several rules to
govern mortgage advertisement, especially relating to ARMs. For example, under the new rules,
if an advertisement includes an annual interest rate such as a teaser rate, and more than one rate
may apply during the loan’s term, the advertisement must disclose all interest rates, the time
period for which they apply, and the loan’s APR. The Federal Trade Commission proposed its
own Mortgage Acts and Practices Advertising rule relating to “unfair or deceptive acts and
practices that may occur with regard to mortgage advertising.” In seeking public comments on
this rule, the FTC highlighted that deceptive claims were frequently aimed at borrowers in the
subprime market. These contained “claims of low ‘teaser’ rates and payment amounts, without
disclosing that the rates and payments would increase substantially after a limited period of time
and misrepresentations that rates were fixed for the full term of the loan.” 7
The other major change in the regulatory landscape following the financial crisis was the
establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). 8 The CFPB proposed
Integrated Mortgage Disclosures, aiming to reduce inconsistencies in mortgage disclosure forms.
The CFPB proposal suggests forms that use clear language and design to make it easier for
consumers to locate key information, such as the interest rate, monthly payments, and costs to
close the loan. The CFPB also has authority to consider complaints regarding misleading
financial advertisements, and the Dodd-Frank Act provides the CFPB with rule-making authority
to prosecute such acts or practices. 9
III. Data
Our data come from two main sources. The first source provides information on advertising,
while the other source provides information on the mortgages. The data on advertising are from
the TNS Media Intelligence (TNSMI) database. TNSMI monitors eleven media channels and
collects information about advertisements at the national and designated market area (DMA)
6

http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/10-15-12-filed_complaint_re_morgan_stanley.pdf (accessed, February 29, 2013)
http://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2010/september/100922mortgageadvertising.pdf (accessed, February 29, 2013)
8
More specifically, this agency was founded as a result of the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation.
9
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual-v2.pdf (accessed, February
29, 2013)
7
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levels. DMA regions are geographic areas in the United States in which the population receives
similar television, radio, and newspaper offerings. DMAs define boundaries of targeted local
advertising and direct marketing campaigns across multiple media. A DMA typically refers to a
certain geographic area rather than a city or county, and may contain zip codes from neighboring
states. A record in our advertising database is the amount a firm spent over a month in a given
media channel in a DMA. The media channels include TV (network, cable, syndication, and
spot), radio (network and local), newspapers (local and national), magazines, and outdoor
advertising, which we describe in detail in Appendix A. In our analysis we focus on local DMAlevel advertising. Compared with national advertising, local advertising is particularly useful in
allowing us to exploit cross-sectional variation across DMAs.
The data on mortgages come from LoanPerformance, a loan-level database that provides a
detailed perspective on the nonagency securities market. The data include, as of December 2006,
more than 7,000 active home equity and nonprime loan pools that contain more than 7 million
active loans with over $1.6 trillion in outstanding balances. LoanPerformance estimates that, as
of 2006, the data cover over 90% of the universe of securitized nonprime loans. The dataset
includes all standard loan application variables, such as the loan amount, loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, FICO credit score, interest rate information about the property being financed by the
borrower, and purpose of the loan. We have information on the type of mortgage loan (fixed rate,
adjustable rate, balloon, or hybrid) and the zip code where the dwelling is located. The data also
provide information on monthly loan-level performance for approved loans (delinquency), which
we use in some of our analysis.
Typically loans are classified as either for purchase or for refinance. In this paper we focus
exclusively on loans for home purchases. We restrict our sample to cover owner-occupied singlefamily residences, townhouses, or condominiums (single-unit loans account for more than 90%
of the loans in our sample). We drop nonconventional properties, such as those that are FHA- or
VA-insured or pledged properties, and also exclude buy-down mortgages. Only those loans with
valid FICO scores are used in our sample.
Since the advertising and mortgage datasets do not have unique identifiers that allow us to match
them directly, we need to rely on matching the datasets using lender names. We proceed in two
steps. First, we clean the names of lenders in the two datasets, accounting for spelling errors
(e.g., Bank of America, Bnk of America) or abbreviations (e.g., New Century, NC, NC
corporation). In the next step we hand-match company names reported by TNSMI to the
corresponding mortgage providers using a conservative approach: names for which we cannot
identify a unique match are excluded from the sample.

7

We are able to match unique mortgage provider names from the TNSMI database with 571 out
of nearly a thousand company names that exist in the mortgage database. Our matched sample
covers 105 of the 210 DMAs, which corresponds to 92% of the population in the United States.
Our data reliably cover advertising information between 2002 and 2006, and as a result we will
be conducting analysis over this period whenever using information about advertising.
IV. Empirical Analysis
IV.A. Descriptive statistics
The matched mortgage providers in our sample advertised in all of the DMAs over our sample
period (January 2002 to December 2006). Los Angeles DMA had the highest number of
mortgage advertisers (49 unique mortgage advertisers). New York DMA had thirty-eight and
Philadelphia DMA had twenty-seven unique mortgage advertisers throughout the sample period.
In terms of total expenditures, the top five DMAs include Los Angeles, New York, San
Francisco, Philadelphia, and Chicago. Panel A of Table 1 reports the total advertising
expenditures in the top five DMAs.
More than 96% of DMA-level mortgage advertising goes through three main channels: local
newspapers, spot TV, and outdoor advertising (i.e., billboards). 10 The average quarterly spending
for mortgage lenders in local newspapers, spot TV, and outdoor advertising is $3.255 million,
$619,000, and $609,000 respectively. In Figure 1(a), we plot the total advertising expenditures in
these three outlets over the sample period by our matched sample of lenders. As can be observed
from this figure, there is significant variation in advertising expenditures both over time and
within a year: mortgage advertising expenditures are typically 25% lower in the first quarter of
the year compared with the average for the rest of the year. Year 2002 advertising expenditures
are considerably lower than the rest of the sample ($7 million). The yearly total advertising
expenditure increases from $15 million to $23.5 million from 2003 to 2006.
Mortgage lenders use newspapers as the dominant channel of local advertising, accounting for
70% of total advertising expenditures, relative to 14% spent on spot TV and 14% on outdoor
advertising. Figure 1(b) shows that there is considerable variation in these expenditure shares
over time. For instance, the newspaper expenditure share is lowest in the first quarter of 2003
(53%). By the end of 2006 this amount increases to 80%. Similarly, spot TV (outdoor)
expenditures range between 2% (1%) and 31% (25%).

10

The remaining 4% is spent in cable TV and magazine categories.
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Figure 2 displays the geographic distribution of regional advertising expenditure by mortgage
lenders in the 206 DMAs across the United States. This includes DMAs in which our vendor did
not collect data (represented in yellow; e.g., Mobile, AL–Pensacola, FL DMA). Orange DMAs
signify regions where lenders spent less than 10 million USD on local mortgage advertising over
the sample period (e.g., Charleston, SC), while red DMAS are regions where lenders spent
between 10 and 50 million USD in local mortgage advertising (e.g., Orlando–Daytona Beach–
Melbourne, FL DMA). Finally, DMAs in brown represents regions where lenders spent more
than 50 million USD for local advertising (e.g., San Francisco–Oakland–San Jose DMA).
It is worth noting that there is substantial variation in the use of local advertising channels by
mortgage lenders. For instance, in Orlando the two dominant channels were newspapers (48%)
and outdoor advertising (36%). In contrast, in Charleston, SC, the two main channels were spot
TV (56%) and outdoor advertising (30%), and in San Francisco, the two lead channels were
newspapers (56%) and spot TV (27%), with the remainder spent on outdoor advertising.
The map clearly shows that there is wide heterogeneity in the intensity and channels of
advertising used by lenders across regions. Importantly, there is variation within regions with
booming real estate markets leading up to the crisis, which includes coastal markets such as
Florida and California. It is this regional variation that will be useful for us to identify the effects
of advertising on lending decisions.
Finally, Panels B and C of Table 1 present summary statistics of ARM and FRM loans originated
by banks over the sample period. The characteristics of loans originated by these banks are
comparable to those in other studies of LoanPerformance data (Keys et al. 2010): the average
loan-to-value ratio is 82%, the average FICO score is 654, and the average interest rate at
origination is around 8–9%.
IV.B. Main results
In this section we present the main analysis of the paper. We start by computing the degree of
relative “expensiveness” of a given mortgage, defined as the price of a mortgage relative to other
mortgages after accounting for a rich set of borrower, contract, and regional characteristics
associated with a given mortgage. Next, we relate the expensiveness of the mortgage sold by a
lender to the degree of advertising by that lender, to study the role of advertising in this market.
We then extensively address alternative explanations to show our results are not spurious.

9

IV.B.1. Measuring mortgage expensiveness
We first measure whether some mortgages are relatively more expensive than others. We start by
computing this measure for adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and focus on reset rates, which
are anecdotally less salient (see Appendix B for examples) and have been discussed by policy
makers as a source of consumers’ confusion. We compute expensiveness based on the idea that if
two identical consumers obtain two ARMs of equal size and characteristics and with the same
initial interest rate, but the reset rate for one consumer is higher, then the consumer with the
higher reset rate is worse off, since she obtains a relatively more “expensive” loan. In this simple
example, given that consumers are identical, the difference in the reset rates would give the
degree of mortgage expensiveness. We apply this intuition in a regression framework and
compute mortgage expensiveness as the residual of the following specification:
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + Γ𝑋𝑖𝑙𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 .

In this specification, i indexes the loan, j indexes the lender, t indexes the quarter, and l indexes
the market (DMA). Our dependent variable is the reset rate on the ARM, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 . The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑙𝑡
contains loan and borrower characteristics such as the loan-to-value ratio, FICO score, whether
the loan has a prepayment penalty, income characteristics and information on income, and racial
and educational composition of the census tract in which the loan was issued.
We also condition on the initial interest rate of the loan, 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 , in order to hold mortgage

characteristics as comparable as possible. The initial interest rate was set using all the
information at the lender’s disposal. It may therefore incorporate information on borrower
quality that is potentially relevant for loan repayment and which we may not possess. The
specification also includes quarter fixed effects, 𝛼𝑡 , to absorb aggregate shocks to mortgage
pricing, which can be driven by aggregate housing demand, interest rate policy, or credit supply
expansion. Finally, the specification also includes location fixed effects, 𝛼𝑙 , to proxy for local
real estate and mortgage market conditions that could affect loan repayment, such as the
elasticity of housing supply or competition in the mortgage market.
The results are presented in Table 2. As can be seen from column 1, the observable loan
characteristics have the expected coefficients. More creditworthy borrowers, as measured by
higher FICO scores, are charged lower interest rates. Mortgages backed by less collateral, with
higher loan-to-value ratios, have higher reset rates. The presence of a prepayment penalty
reduces the reset rate, and if the loan is low-documentation, it increases the reset rates. The
coefficient on the initial interest rate (β) is positive and statistically significant. Thus, conditional
on observed borrower characteristics, a high initial interest rate is positively correlated with the
10

reset rate, indicating that it reflects additional information on the borrower not reflected in other
observable characteristics.
Not all the mortgages in our data are ARMs. Approximately 27% are fixed-rate mortgages
(FRMs). One downside of using FRMs is that they have only one interest rate. As a result, these
regressions cannot condition on as much information as ARMs; we cannot use the initial interest
rate to control for lenders’ information that is not contained in observable borrower
characteristics. Thus, to compute expensiveness for these mortgages, we use the initial interest
rate as the dependent variable. As can be observed from column 2 of Table 2, the results are
similar to those obtained for ARMs. For instance, as before, the coefficient on credit score is
negative, while the loan-to-value ratio coefficient is positive.
Overall, our model does well in explaining the substantial variation in reset rates in our sample
with an adjusted R2 of 56%. The residual from the regression measures the ARM reset rate the
borrower was charged relative to the average borrower with the same set of observable
characteristics, the same initial interest rate, in the same region and the same quarter:
�𝑋𝑖𝑙𝑡 �.
ε�𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 − �𝛽̂ 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼�𝑡 + 𝛼�𝑙 + Γ

Since the measure is computed from residuals it can take negative and positive values.
Mortgages with negative (positive) expensiveness are cheaper (more expensive) than the mean
mortgage with the same characteristics. It is important to reemphasize that the essence of this
metric is that if identical consumers obtain the same mortgage with different reset rates, then the
difference in the reset rates measures how much worse the choice of the consumer with the
higher reset rate is.
Figure 3(a) plots these residuals for ARMs. We find large differences in reset rates charged to
borrowers with the same characteristics in a given location. For completeness, in Figure 3(b) we
repeat this analysis for all mortgages and find similar patterns. Note that when we compute
expensiveness for all mortgages, we take the residuals for ARM loans using the specification in
column 1 of Table 2 and for FRM loans using the specification in column 2 of Table 2.
A simple way of assessing the patterns in expensiveness is to plot the difference in mortgage
expensiveness between the 95th and 5th percentiles in a given DMA in a given quarter. We do
this in Figure 4(a). The mean difference in reset rates after conditioning on borrower, loan, and
regional characteristics is 3.1 percentage points. This is a large difference—in the raw data,
without adjusting for any lender, mortgage, or geographic characteristics, this difference is 5.8
percentage points. Such high dispersion in interest rates is not unusual for financial products:
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Hortacsu and Syverson (2004), for example, find substantial dispersion among S&P 500 index
funds with the 90-10 percentile price (fee) ratio of 8.2.
Borrowers with the same characteristics obtain substantially different ARM reset rates during the
sample period. These rates can differ because there is dispersion in the rates charged by a given
lender while all lenders charge on average the same rate; alternatively, lenders may charge on
average different mortgage rates, with some lenders being more expensive than others. To
compute whether a lender charges on average higher prices than other lenders in the same market
in a given quarter, we average the expensiveness of individual loans for this lender in that
location and quarter. Formally, let 𝑛𝑗𝑙𝑡 be the number of loans of lender j in location l in quarter

t. Lender expensiveness is computed as:

𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑡 =

1
� ε�𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑛𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑖

Computing average lender expensiveness is also useful because we want to use this variable as
an input in regressions with advertising, which we observe at the lender level.
Figure 4(b) shows the distribution of differences between the 95th and 5th percentiles of lender
expensiveness in a given location and quarter. There are substantial differences in average
residual reset rates charged by different lenders. This distribution is somewhat less spread out
when compared with the difference across individual loans presented in Figure 3(a). This is
expected, since some of the dispersion at the loan level may be due to noise, and aggregating at
the lender level decreases the noise. The mean difference in reset rates charged by lenders
between the 95th and 5th percentiles is 2.8 percentage points. Thus, there is large variation
among the average prices lenders charge for mortgages in a given market in the same quarter.
Measuring expensiveness, ε�𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 , is a central input into the rest of the analysis and we want to

ensure the results do not rely on the linear specification we used to obtain them. We recompute
our main results in the paper relaxing the specification used to compute expensiveness. In
particular, we estimate a significantly more flexible version of the specification by using
polynomials of second and third degree (with all interactions) of loan observables 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 =

𝑃𝑛 �𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑙𝑡 � + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + ε𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 , in which n is the degree of the polynomial. The results obtained
with these measures of expensiveness are robust (Table A1, columns 1 and 2).

Recall that we compute expensiveness based on the idea that if two identical consumers obtain
two ARMs of equal size and characteristics and with the same initial interest rate, but the reset
rate for one consumer is higher, then the consumer with the higher reset rate is worse off, since
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she obtains a relatively “expensive” loan. For robustness, we also ensure our measure maps into
this idea more closely. Specifically, we estimate the expensiveness regression
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + Γ𝑋𝑖𝑙𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡

separately for deciles of the initial interest rate and for 20 equally spaced bins of initial interest
rate (cut in 5 percentile increments, corresponding to approximately 20 bp intervals). The results
obtained with these measures of expensiveness also provide similar inferences (Table A1,
columns 3 and 4). In unreported tests we also recompute the distribution estimating the
regressions at a much finer level of geography (zip codes rather than DMAs). This alleviates
concerns that differences in regional factors vary significantly within the level of location that is
defined in our regressions. Our inferences are unchanged.
IV.B.2. Advertising and expensiveness
In this section we explore the central question in the paper: does advertising lure consumers to
enter expensive mortgages or does it help consumers find cheaper mortgages? We test these
hypotheses by examining whether advertisers are relatively more “expensive.” We first examine
this hypothesis by plotting the distribution of residual reset rates for advertisers and
nonadvertisers in Figure 5. We purge the initial interest rate, borrower characteristics, location,
and year fixed effects when plotting the residuals as in Table 2. As can be observed, the
distribution of reset rates of advertisers is shifted to the right of nonadvertisers. A KolmogorovSmirnov test rejects the equality of the two distributions at the 1% level. Thus, lenders who
advertise sell more expensive mortgages.
While this simple cut of the data is suggestive of the persuasive view of advertising, we now
explore whether advertisers sell more expensive mortgages more systematically by estimating
the following specification:
𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + ε𝑗𝑙𝑡 ,

where 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑙𝑡 is the independent variable of interest and measures the total dollar value

of local advertising of lender j in market l in quarter t. In subsequent specifications we also use
𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑙𝑡 to denote dollar value of local advertising through different media.

When we construct our measure of lender expensiveness, we already condition on borrower
characteristics and mortgage characteristics, including the initial interest, and compute the
expensiveness of a mortgage relative to other loans in the same location. In effect, we measure
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how expensive a lender is in a given location relative to other lenders in the same location. This
is our dependent variable 𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑡 .

The specification includes lender fixed effects 𝛼𝑗 , since we are interested in exploiting within-

lender variation in advertising. For example, if predatory lenders are likely to advertise, our
lender fixed effects will absorb that variation. Similarly, lender fixed effects will control for
differences in lenders’ propensity to securitize mortgages (see Keys et al. 2010) or provide
renegotiations in the case of borrower distress (see Piskorski et al. 2010), or if some lenders are
more “consumer friendly,” have a better brand, or have cheaper access to capital.
The specification we estimate also includes location fixed effects 𝛼𝑙 . Consequently, the results
we find are not driven by the notion that lenders advertise more in more attractive locations in
which they can charge more for mortgages because of local real estate and mortgage market
conditions. The specification also includes quarter fixed effects 𝛼𝑡 to absorb aggregate shocks to
mortgage pricing that may be correlated with advertising due to trends in advertising in the data.
Intuitively, in the specification above we compare whether a lender is more expensive relative to
nonadvertisers in regions in which it advertises more.
The results are presented in Panel A of Table 3. The coefficient on the advertising in column 1 is
positive and statistically significant at 5%. This implies that, keeping observable borrower
characteristics fixed, lenders charge higher mortgage prices relative to other lenders in regions in
which they advertise relatively more. This result is inconsistent with the view that advertising
provided more information on mortgage pricing to consumers. Instead, it suggests that
advertising steered consumers to expensive mortgages, leading them to worse mortgage choices
than they would have otherwise made. This is the baseline result of this paper.
We examine whether the relationship between local advertising and mortgage pricing varies
across different types of media. Newspapers are the largest medium of local mortgage
advertising (see Table 1, Panel A, and Figure 1(b)). Since other advertising media are
significantly smaller, we aggregate them into a category called “other” advertising. The results
from this analysis are presented in columns 2 and 3. The effect of advertising on expensiveness
of ARMs is driven by advertising in newspapers—the coefficient on newspaper advertising is
17% larger than the coefficient on total advertising. This is an economically large effect. The
coefficient implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in advertising increases the average
reset rate a lender charges in that location by roughly 80 basis points, or approximately one-half
of a standard deviation in reset rates. Other advertising has a positive coefficient that is slightly
smaller than the coefficient on total advertising and is statistically insignificant.
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We also replicate our results by adding data on FRMs in Panel B of Table 3. As mentioned
above, we compute expensiveness for all mortgages by taking the residuals for ARM loans using
the regression specification in column 1 of Table 2 and for FRM loans using the specification in
column 2 of Table 2. We obtain similar inferences as before. Together, the results presented
above are consistent with the persuasive view of advertising--lenders use advertising to steer
borrowers into more expensive mortgages.
IV.B.3. Who is more susceptible to advertising?
If advertising exploits uninformed consumers and steers them into expensive mortgages, then we
would expect mortgage advertising to be most effective with consumers who are potentially less
informed about mortgages and therefore more vulnerable to manipulation. Hall and Woodward
(2012) show that groups that are likely less informed, such as minorities and the less educated,
are charged higher brokerage fees in the mortgage market.
We examine whether the effect of advertising on mortgage pricing differs across these groups.
We first compute the share of loans to minorities by weighing each loan by the share of
minorities in the zip code in which the loan was issued for each lender/year/quarter. We define
observations with a share of minorities below-the-median as low minority share and those with
an above-the-median share of minorities as high minority share. We use the same approach to
find observations with a high and low share of educated (households with a BA degree) and poor
borrowers (as defined by the Census). Next, we reestimate our baseline specification,
𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + ε𝑗𝑙𝑡 ,

on the subsamples of loans with high and low minority share, high and low education share, and
high and low poverty share.
The results are presented in Table 4. As predicted, the effect of advertising on mortgage pricing
is concentrated in lenders with high-minority portfolio areas. This suggests that within lenders,
advertising is effective at drawing borrowers into more expensive mortgages only for lenders
who lend heavily to minorities. We find no such effect for lenders with a low minority share.
Similarly, the effect of advertising is concentrated in lenders who lend to less-educated areas and
areas with a higher share of poor borrowers. Together these results strongly suggest that
mortgage advertising was used to steer consumers into ARMs with higher reset rates.
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IV.B.4. Unobservable borrower quality
We have shown that lenders sell relatively more expensive mortgages in geographical areas in
which they advertise relatively more. We interpreted this evidence as suggesting that lenders use
advertising to steer consumers into expensive mortgages. A potential alternative explanation is
that even after we condition on extensive observable borrower and loan characteristics as well as
the region and time period, we only partially capture borrowers’ true ability to repay a loan.
Advertisers charging higher mortgage rates might simply reflect the fact that they lend to a pool
of borrowers who are less likely to repay a loan.
We confront this alternative head-on and test whether advertising is positively correlated with
borrowers falling behind on their loan payments using the following regression:
𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + ε𝑗𝑙𝑡 .

Here, 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑙𝑡 measurers the percentage of loans made by lender j in location l in quarter t

that turned out to be delinquent. We follow the convention in the literature (e.g., Keys et al.
2010) and capture loan performance with an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the borrower
becomes late by 90 days or more (90+ delinquent) in making payments within two years of
origination, and 0 otherwise. To make the specification comparable to the earlier one, we include
location, time, and lender fixed effects, 𝛼𝑙 , 𝛼𝑡 , and 𝛼𝑗 , respectively. Thus, in this specification,

similar to those used in Table 3, we will exploit the variation within a lender, in a given location,
and in a given quarter.
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 5. If the alternative explanation holds and
advertisers attract borrowers who are less likely to repay a loan, we should find that these
borrowers are more likely to fall behind on their payments. As a result, we should expect the
coefficient on advertising in the regression would be positive. In fact, the correlation of
advertising and delinquency is negative, whether we measure delinquency on the main sample of
ARM loans or if we include FRM loans. These findings are at odds with the alternative
explanation outlined above.
Our results show that advertising raises the interest rate charged to borrowers. Higher interest
rates should directly lead to more delinquency and default since a borrower with a given income
stream should have a more difficult time repaying a loan with higher interest payments. This
indirect effect of advertising through higher interest rates should generate a positive correlation
between advertisers, who on average charge higher interest rates, and delinquency.
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The fact that we find a negative, albeit statistically insignificant, relationship between advertising
and delinquency would suggest that advertising attracts borrowers who are more likely to repay a
loan. This factor more than offsets the potential indirect effect that advertising has on
delinquency because of increased interest rates. Alternatively put, advertisers should charge
lower reset rates than nonadvertisers to borrowers who look the same on observable
characteristics, if pricing only reflected borrower characteristics. Thus, our estimates of the effect
of advertising on loan prices are probably an underestimate of the true effect. Using instrumental
variables in the next section will allow us to obtain a better estimate of the true effect.
IV.B.5. Differences in ex ante catering costs
Another worry with our analysis could be that the consumers who are being offered expensive
mortgages are, in fact, costly to cater to. In a competitive market, some of the additional catering
costs would be passed on by the lenders to these borrowers. If advertising lenders lend to many
such borrowers, we could potentially observe a positive correlation between advertising and
expensiveness. In Section IV.C.5 we show that our estimates are too large to be plausibly
explained by differences in such catering costs. Nevertheless, here we try to provide more direct
evidence that challenges the plausibility of this alternative.
Testing the alternative requires detailed information on costs borne by lenders when catering to
various borrowers. Because such data are highly proprietary, they are not available for the entire
sample. Fortunately we do have access to detailed costs borne by a large subprime lender, the
third largest in the United States as of 2006, in our sample. The data contain information on the
costs borne by the borrower in filling applications, fees charges by loan officers as a part of
underwriting and processing applications and detailed borrower information. We merge this with
our dataset on advertising by this lender to conduct our analysis.
As shown in Section IV.B.3, we find our effects in the subsamples that are heavily tilted to
minority, poor and less educated borrowers. To explain our results these borrowers would have
to have significantly higher catering costs. We therefore use information on the background of
borrowers and stratify based on whether the borrowers are in a minority or not. We separately
analyze costs for ARMs and FRMs and present the results in Panels A and B of Table 6. As can
be observed, there are no economically meaningful differences. 11 In fact, if anything minorities
are charged total fees that are somewhat lower than non-minorities. In unreported tests we also
analyze these differences, stratifying the borrowers into two categories based on their monthly
income. Again, we find no differences in cost of originating across the two categories.

11

The difference in costs and fees across groups in the entire table is economically miniscule relative to how
expensive a mortgage is obtained by consumers who borrow from advertising lenders (discussed in Section IV.C.5).
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Notably, this lender is a fairly high advertiser, placing in the top quartile of advertisers in our
sample period. In Panels C and D of Table 6, we examine whether the lender actually realizes
higher costs of originating loans in periods in which it advertises more. We find no such
differences.
Overall, under the reasonable assumption that the lending practices of this large subprime lender
are representative for the entire sample, this analysis reveals that our results that advertisers sell
more expensive mortgages is unlikely to be due to higher costs faced by these lenders when
catering to borrowers.
IV.C. Evidence from Craigslist
In this section we explicitly address the concern that lenders advertise in regions with borrowers
who differ on unobservables, by exploiting variation in advertising that is uncorrelated with
borrowers’ ability to repay/catering costs. We use the introduction of Craigslist into different
markets over time to obtain variation in mortgage advertising.
Craigslist is one of the largest online forums for classified advertisement. The advantage of
Craigslist is that it is segregated across markets. The website for San Francisco classifieds is
separate from the Chicago website. As Figure 6 shows, the introduction of Craigslist has been
staggered across the United States, starting in San Francisco in 1999 and continuing through the
duration of our sample. While its main business is to provide a forum for free advertising of
goods, jobs, apartments for rent, and personal ads, it also provides a forum for free mortgage
advertising in its financial services section. In a 2011 survey, 21% of consumers reported that
they obtain most information about “Local Housing and Real Estate” from “other websites,”
defined as a “NOT print or TV news org. site or gov’t site, includes nat’l sites that offer local
info, such as weather.com, craigslist [emphasis added], or patch.com” (Pew Research Center
2011, p. 57). Craigslist’s appeal is large enough that it has had a significant impact on job
advertising in newspapers (Kroft and Pope 2012).
To ensure that Craigslist is indeed a viable venue for mortgage classifieds, providing a plausible
source of variation in mortgage advertising, we collect data on mortgage-related classified ads on
Craigslist’s financial services page during the period of our sample (see Appendix C for details).
Appendixes C.4-C.6 provide historical examples of mortgage classifieds on Craigslist during our
sample period for Jacksonville, FL, Washington, DC, and Indianapolis, IN, respectively. Table
A2 shows that across all 23 markets with Craigslist presence, mortgage-related classifieds
represent a substantial share of Craigslist financial services classifieds, from 4.8% in Dallas, TX,
to 12.3% in Pittsburgh, PA. Therefore, Craigslist introduction could plausibly affect the amount
of local mortgage advertising in venues other than Craigslist, especially in newspapers.
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We use the introduction of Craigslist to perturb the differences in advertising intensity between
lenders in a market. Since our identification is driven by the heterogeneous impact Craigslist has
on advertisers within a market, our identification is valid even if Craigslist entry affects the
market-level pricing of mortgages directly. Given that advertising on Craigslist is free, we expect
Craigslist entry to decrease the payoff to paid mortgage advertising. 12 Following this reasoning,
we first show that Craigslist’s introduction, while unrelated to the mortgage market conditions,
indeed decreased mortgage advertising in our data, especially in newspapers. Therefore the
difference in paid advertising between lenders in a market decreases after Craigslist entry
relative to markets in which it does not enter. In Section IV.C.3 we show that lenders who
decrease paid advertising after Craigslist entry do not offset this decrease by substituting into
Craigslist advertising. Craigslist entry thus reduces the differences in total advertising between
lenders in a market, even accounting for Craigslist advertisements. We then study how this
variation in advertising affects relative pricing of mortgages between lenders in a market.
IV.C.1 Descriptive analysis
We first study whether the introduction of Craigslist has the hypothesized effect on mortgage
pricing graphically. We expect that mortgage advertising of advertisers relative to nonadvertisers
decreases upon Craigslist entry, also decreasing mortgage pricing of advertisers. In Figure 7 we
plot the distribution of residual reset rates for advertisers and nonadvertisers across our sample,
separated based on whether the observation had a Craigslist presence or not. 13 Nonadvertisers
should not be affected by Craigslist entry and are the control group. Note that since all our prices
are computed after purging market and time fixed effects, we are only looking at relative pricing
in the market. Thus if all lenders advertise on Craigslist, and this depresses or increases the
overall level of prices, the direct effect of Craigslist is purged.
Indeed, Craigslist has little effect on pricing of mortgages by nonadvertisers. The modes of the
distribution are the same, as is the left tail—the only difference is that reset rates are slightly
higher for Craigslist observations in the right tail. Craigslist entry has a different effect on
advertisers, which are our treatment group. The distribution of interest rates for advertisers is
shifted to the left after Craigslist entry, which includes leftward shift of the mode of the
distribution. Notably, the right tail shifts up in the same way as in the control group. Overall, the
left shift in the distribution suggests that Craigslist induces advertisers to decrease reset rates
relative to nonadvertisers.

12
13

This is akin to Kroft and Pope 2012, who show that jobs advertising in newspapers declines after Craigslist entry.
We purge the initial interest rate, borrower characteristics, location, and year fixed effects.
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IV.C.2 Regression analysis
We now more formally examine whether Craigslist entry leads to a relative decrease in
advertising, and whether this shift in advertising leads to a change in mortgage pricing. We first
estimate the effect that the introduction of Craigslist has on mortgage advertising:
𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + ν𝑗𝑙𝑡 ,

where 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating the presence of Craigslist in a

given location l in period t. These specifications include market, time, and lender fixed effects,
𝛼𝑙 , 𝛼𝑡 , and 𝛼𝑗 , respectively. Market fixed effects account for the fact that Craigslist potentially

enters markets where advertising happens to be high. Time fixed effects control for the
possibility that advertising and Craigslist reach expanded during our sample. Lender fixed effects
control for the possibility that lenders who advertise happen to do so in markets that Craigslist
enters. 14

We present the results from the first stage in Panel A of Table 7. We find that Craigslist entry in
a market decreases the amount of advertising. The economic impact is large and suggests a
reduction in amount of advertising by $2,465 per quarter for a given lender. This result is highly
statistically significant and exceeds the Stock and Yogo (2005) statistical tests for weak
instruments. We next examine whether the effect is larger for newspaper classifieds, which are
close substitutes to the free classifieds provided by Craigslist. As is shown in columns 2 and 3,
the Craigslist introduction decreases newspaper advertising by $1,553, twice as much as other
advertising ($652). These results resonate well with findings in Kroft and Pope (2012), who
show that Craigslist had a large effect on job advertising in newspapers.
Now that we have established that the entry of Craigslist had a large and significant impact on
mortgage advertising, we want to exploit this variation in an instrumental variable setting to
assess the effect of advertising on the overpricing of ARMs. Recall that our calculation of
overpricing 𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑡 already conditions on consumers’ observable characteristics and location fixed

effects. The endogeneity concern we had in the baseline specification was that unobservable
consumer characteristics, which affect lenders’ profitability, are correlated with advertising.

14

A simple example helps illustrate the empirical strategy. Suppose there are two markets, A and B, with Craigslist
entering Market A at some point during our sample. Our specification compares the amount of advertising that
lender j did relative to other lenders in Market A before Craigslist entry with the amount of advertising the same
lender did relative to other lenders in this market after Craigslist entry. We compare this change with the change in
relative advertising of lender j in Market B, which did not experience Craigslist entry.
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We exploit the variation in Craigslist entry to estimate the effect of advertising on the pricing of
ARMs with the following equation:
� 𝚥𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + ε𝑗𝑙𝑡 ,
𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝚤𝑠𝚤𝑛𝑔

� 𝚥𝑙𝑡 is the fitted value from the first stage. The standard errors reported in our
where 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝚤𝑠𝚤𝑛𝑔

analysis account for the generated regressor from the first stage. The analysis from the second
stage is presented in Panel B of Table 7. Column 1 shows that the coefficient on advertising is
positive and highly statistically significant. We discuss the magnitude of these results in Section
IV.C.5.

In columns 2 and 3, we separately estimate the effect of advertising across various types of
media and find that advertising in newspapers has the largest effect on mortgage prices. The
coefficient on advertising in other media is highly statistically significant, but economically
smaller. The effects are similar, both quantitatively and qualitatively, if we include FRMs as a
robustness check (Panel D).
IV.C.3 Substituting paid advertising with advertising on Craigslist
One concern with our analysis is that advertisers in our sample may use Craigslist with higher
intensity than lenders who did not use paid advertising. Then, after accounting for Craigslist ads,
the difference in total amount of advertising between paid advertisers and nonadvertisers would
not decrease, as posited earlier. We now explore this issue in detail.
We collect historical data on mortgage postings on Craigslist. Specifically, for each market listed
in Table A2, and for all months between 2002 and 2006, we download all postings in the
financial services section. We then identify the lender name associated with each of the posts.
We find 371 unique mortgage lenders who advertised on Craigslist during our sample period, of
which only 28 match our data. These 28 unique lenders represent 1.3% of total lenders in our
dataset. Approximately half of these lenders advertise at least once in our data. Next, we assess
whether the increase in Craigslist advertising could offset the decline in paid advertising by
advertising lenders and bias our earlier inferences.
As noted above, the number of lenders in our data who use Craigslist is very small. Moreover,
advertisers who use Craigslist do not seem to be large paid advertisers in our data. These lenders
spent $22.1 million in paid advertising throughout sample period, which corresponds to just
2.01% of total mortgage advertisement in our main dataset ($1.05 billion). Consequently, we do
not expect our estimates in Table 7 (Panel B) to be driven by these lenders.
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We show this formally in Table 7 (Panel C). We reestimate the regressions excluding the 28
lenders who advertise on Craigslist. The results show that the estimates are virtually identical to
those reported earlier. Together, this analysis rules out the possibility that an increase in
advertising on Craigslist could have offset the decline in paid advertisers within lenders, thereby
affecting the instrumental variable (IV) estimate.
IV.C.4 Pre- and post- trends around Craigslist introduction
Our identifying assumption when using the Craigslist instrument is that Craigslist does not enter
regions in which mortgage advertising has already decreased, and advertising lenders do not
experience an increase in unobservable borrower quality relative to nonadvertising lenders in
these regions during the same time
We first explore if Craigslist enters areas in which mortgage advertising is in decline by
examining the timing of the advertising decline relative to Craigslist entry. The results are
presented in Table 8. Advertising starts declining only one quarter before Craigslist entry, but the
magnitude of the decline significantly increases upon entry and already doubles a quarter after
entry. The one-quarter lead suggests that Craigslist entry into a market is not a complete surprise
to the market participants, who decrease their advertising a bit expecting the entry that is soon to
follow. 15
Second, in Table 8 we show that Craigslist entry does not predict changes in the borrower pool
relative to regions that did not experience the introduction of Craigslist. This is the case for
borrower quality as measured by credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, prepayment penalty, or the
share of low-documentation loans. The coefficients around the Craigslist effect are economically
small, statistically weak, and unstable. For example, for the loan-to-value ratio the largest
coefficient is 0.231, where the mean ratio is 87 and the effect disappears a quarter after Craigslist
entry. The case for low-documentation loans is similar, with magnitudes being small and
coefficients unstable. The most stable change in observables correlated with Craigslist entry is
the prepayment pool, but the magnitudes here are also economically small. Together, these
results reaffirm that the explanation that advertising attracts borrowers of different riskiness or
catering costs is not likely driving our findings.

15

This notion is reasonable since the entry is discussed in several online forums in the few periods before Craigslist
enters a given market. In particular, individuals can request that Craigslist add a city in a forum, where user votes
can potentially influence such a decision. http://www.ehow.com/how_10065823_city-added-craigslist.html
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IV.C.5 Magnitude of the effect
We now provide a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation to interpret the magnitude of our
estimates. We use the instrumental variable estimate, because it is identified by the cleanest
source of variation. The coefficient of 0.0711 implies that a $1,000 increase in quarterly
advertising expenses increases the average reset rate of loans made by that lender by 7.1 basis
points. The average lender that advertises spends $25,460 per quarter, which translates into a
reset rate 181 basis points higher.
For ease of comparison we provide alternative ways of interpreting these magnitudes. The
average mortgage amount in our data is approximately $200,000. To obtain the upper bound of
this effect, assume that the mortgages are not prepaid or renegotiated, nor do they default. This
calculation would be appropriate for borrowers who continue to obtain mortgages from
advertisers and continuously pay the higher rate even upon refinancing a mortgage. For the
average ARM in the data, the reset rate comes into effect after two years and lasts for fifteen
years. Further, assume a 10% discount rate on the mortgage payments to bring them to present
value. This implies that the consumer who obtains a mortgage from an average advertising
lender pays approximately $21,250 more than a consumer who obtains a mortgage from a nonadvertiser in present-value terms.
As stated, this estimate is an upper bound on the possible overpayment amount through higher
interest payments. In reality, mortgages default, are prepaid, or are renegotiated. Therefore, the
borrower’s effective time of overpayment is shorter than the duration of the mortgage. For
instance, if the average borrower pays the reset on an ARM for three years and the overpayment
of the current mortgage does not spill into the next mortgage, then the present value of
overpayment is approximately $7,440. While this is a substantial amount, it is in the same order
of magnitude as the estimates of losses faced by mortgage borrowers because they do not
properly account for broker service fees given in Hall and Woodward (2012).
It is worth noting that this back-of-the-envelope calculation relies on several simplifying
assumptions. For example, if ARMs have prepayment penalties, and higher reset rates ex post
lead to larger penalties, this will increase borrowers’ mortgage cost. Therefore, our calculations
should be interpreted with appropriate caution. Moreover, the IV estimate that we use represents
a local treatment effect, so the usual caution about its broader applicability is in order when
interpreting these magnitudes. Further, our calculation only considers the direct cost that
borrowers incur from being steered to a more expensive mortgage through advertising.
Mortgages with higher interest rates also have the indirect effect of increasing consumers’
probability of default. For instance, Rajan et al. (2010) find that increasing the interest rate by a
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percentage point significantly increases the probability of default. 16 The cost of this indirect
effect is difficult to quantify but can represent a significant welfare loss to the consumer.
V. Advertising Content
We now directly explore the content of mortgage advertisements. Our analysis up to this point
shows that advertising is used in mortgage markets to steer consumers to more expensive
mortgages. One channel at work might be that consumers have a difficult time understanding
resets, possibly because reset rates are less salient or shrouded attributes of a mortgage and
advertising is used to exploit this problem. Anecdotal evidence, which claims that advertising
increases the salience of initial interest rates in mortgages and downplays the salience of reset
rates, provides support for such a channel. Here we examine this claim explicitly by showing that
reset rates are almost never advertised. Next, we show that even when explicit interest rates are
advertised in this market it is not necessarily that lenders who advertise mortgages with lower
interest rates are indeed cheaper. Last, we confirm the idea that mortgage ads are not very
informative by showing that very few actual mortgage or lender characteristics are advertised.
We analyze the content of 37,432 mortgage advertising campaigns in print and direct mail
collected by Comperemedia during our sample period (2002–2006). Comperemedia tracks direct
mail and print (e.g., newspapers and trade publications) advertising campaigns in the United
States for several products, including mortgages. A typical advertisement campaign contains
information on an “offer” (e.g., “5.375% interest rate for a 5/1 year LIBOR”), advertiser
information (e.g., Old Merchants Mortgage Bank), and geographic reach (e.g., New York DMA).
Using the details of the advertisement “offer,” we extract the information content of these
advertisements related to price (interest rate), lender, product (ARM or FRM), the horizon of the
mortgage, and other non-price-related characteristics of the mortgage. Our analysis uses
information on three different types of advertising a firm potentially uses: (1) to explicitly
advertise mortgage interest rates, (2) to advertise non-price characteristics of a mortgage, or (3)
to simply advertise the existence of the lender, i.e., brand advertising.
V.A. Salience of initial rates and reset rates in advertisements
One possible reason why advertising can attract consumers to expensive mortgages is that
consumers focus on the salient initial interest rate rather than the less salient reset rate. This
channel would not be a likely explanation of our results if advertising clearly states both the
initial interest rate and the reset rate and places them on the same footing. While anecdotal
16

In our data advertising has a negative correlation with borrower defaults, conditioning on borrowers’ observable
characteristics. From that we infer that the unobservable quality of borrowers who are attracted to advertising is
better than suggested by their observable characteristics. Conditioning on borrowers’ true underlying quality, higher
ARM reset rates would lead to more defaults.
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evidence indicates that reset rates are rarely advertised, we now provide systematic analysis to
explore this claim.
Panel A of Table 9 shows that advertising interest rates is an important aspect of ARM
advertising. In campaigns which are explicit about advertising ARMs, 69% advertise a numerical
interest rate. The word “Reset” is mentioned in only thirteen campaigns, or 0.03% of campaigns.
17
This implies that the explicit interest rate mentioned in these campaigns do not advertise reset
rates but rather advertise an introductory rate.
Next we explore cases of advertisements that explicitly advertise both the initial interest rate and
the reset rate, even if they do not clearly contain the word “Reset” in the advertisements. As
shown in Panel B of Table 9, in our sample, 35% of advertisements contain information on two
interest rates. The second interest rate in these advertisements in not a reset rate. Instead, in 86%
of these campaigns the second interest rate is the stated APR of the loan, and the remaining
13.9% advertised two different products.
To give a sense of whether reset rate is ever advertised we search more broadly across all
advertisements in our data. We find only seven campaigns advertised an explicit reset rate. That
is, only 0.02% of all the campaigns in the data, both the initial interest rate and the reset rate are
advertised. These results clearly illustrate that while advertising initial interest rates is an
important part of mortgage advertising, information on reset rates is omitted. This result casts
strong doubt on the hypothesis that reset rates and initial rates are given the same amount of
prominence in advertisements.
The relative salience of the initial interest rate is not only increased by explicitly stating the
initial rate and omitting the reset rate. We also examine how advertising language is used to
increase the salience of the initial interest rate. Panel C of Table 9 shows that 13% of
advertisements use attention grabbing phrases “as low as,” “intro,” “initial” or “starting.” These
phrases are prominently displayed in these advertisements and the interest rate that follows these
phrases is the initial interest rate.
V.B. Do low advertised rates designate cheap lenders?
While we have established that reset rates are not advertised, Panel D of Table 9 shows that a
large number of advertising campaigns (54%) do contain APR information. We now explore if a
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Similarly, “thereafter”, used in the context related to ARM loans shows up infrequently in the advertisements. In
particular, 227 advertising campaigns (0.61% of total advertisements in our sample) use "thereafter" to refer to a
period after the initial rate expires. Interestingly, the phrase is generally not followed by an actual reset rate. For
example, “4.5% for 5 years, thereafter according to prime.”
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consumer who follows the advertisement with a lower advertised APR 18 finds an inexpensive
lender. We conduct this analysis on a sample of 70 lenders (around 6,000 advertisement
campaigns) for whom we are able to match the advertising content data and the mortgage data.
Specifically, we estimate the following regression:
𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + 𝛼𝑗 + ε𝑗𝑙𝑡 ,
in which an observation is an advertisement campaign by a lender j in location l at time t,
𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑡 measures lenders’ expensiveness, and 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑙𝑡 measures the advertised APR across

advertisements by the same lender in a given location and quarter. It is worth pointing out that
there is substantial variation in advertised APR within locations and quarter -- even after
conditioning out location and quarter fixed effects the standard deviation of APR is 2.8
percentage points, suggesting that lenders advertise substantially different APR rates. We cluster
the standard errors by lender since we could have several advertisements by the same lender in a
given location and quarter. We also include lender and time fixed effects in this specification.
Table 10 shows that advertised APR is negatively correlated with lenders’ expensiveness. As can
be seen, these results are estimated with noise once we control for location. At best, the
advertised APR is not likely to lead borrowers who follow the advertisement to an inexpensive
lender. Worse, it may lead consumers to a more expensive lender. These results show that even
when information on interest rates are explicitly mentioned in advertisements -- and these rates
(APRs) are easily comparable -- they do not help customers find cheaper lenders.
V.C. What information is contained in mortgage advertisements?
Last, we explore how much information is contained in advertisements about the mortgage
product being sold and about the characteristics of the lender.
An analysis of the quantitative information available in an advertisement across the entire sample
reveals lack of information on the most basic features of the mortgage. For instance, as Panel D
of Table 9 shows, 17% of advertisements have no numbers. Only about 45% of the
advertisement mention a dollar figure to indicate a mortgage amount. Similarly, 59% of the
advertisements have no mention of the horizon of the mortgage. As mentioned earlier, the
mortgage is an ARM or that it adjusts is mentioned in only 16% of advertisements. We also note
that around 18% of advertisements (6,563) contain no numeric information. 19 These statistics
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Comperemedia collects advertised APR information from print advertisements. We use this variable in our
specification, but we achieve qualitatively similar results if we instead use the APRs we extract from the
advertisement language.
19
Notably, in unreported tabulations we find that 15% of advertisements contain no information on product
characteristics or interest rates, and instead contain only basic information on the lender, such as lender name and
location.
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show that while mortgage advertisements certainly provide some basic information on the
mortgage, this information is very limited.
To reinforce this point, we tabulate the top fifty words used in mortgage print and direct mail
advertisements and present the results in Table A3. In order to understand whether
advertisements contain words that could differentiate mortgages from one another, we eliminated
the following words: (1) most common words in English as defined by the Oxford English
Corpus; 20 (2) words referring to a price or time period; and (3) words that exist in almost all
advertisements (i.e., “mortgage,” “loan,” and “payments”). Our results reveal that words such as
“low,” “opportunity,” “used,” “home,” and “based” are the most common words found in the
advertisements. Very few, if any, of these words could be used to differentiate mortgages in a
particularly targeted way. In addition, we found no evidence that lenders advertised
differentiation in characteristics such as their servicing or renegotiation practices.
These simple tabulations reject the notion that advertisements are used to advertise differentiated
or specialized mortgages that certain subsegments of borrowers might be attracted to. The
information advertised is most rudimentary and is on generic, non-differentiating characteristic
such as mortgage length. Moreover, the amount of information disclosed is very limited and it
would be quite difficult for even the most sophisticated consumers to obtain a complete picture
of the product advertised.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
VI. A What models of advertising does the evidence support?
Our first set of findings is that firms with a higher advertising intensity in the market charge
higher mortgage prices, especially when making loans in areas with a prevalence of minority,
less educated, and poor borrowers. Our battery of tests can help rule out several competing
explanations for our findings. First, we exploit within lender variation in our analysis. This
allows us to avoid concerns that it is lender characteristics—such as the lender’s brand, other
lenders’ activities aimed at attracting customers, propensity to renegotiate or securitize, servicing
practices, or marginal costs -- which may be correlated with advertising, that are driving the
results. Second, and as discussed in Sections IV.B.4 and IV.B.5, it is unlikely that the expensive
mortgages originated by advertisers purely reflect unobservable risk of borrowers or higher costs
of catering to these borrowers. We further weaken these alternatives by using the Craigslist
instrument in IV.C. Finally, a simple explanation in which advertisers attract consumers and the
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In linguistics, a corpus is a large and structured set of texts, which are used to check occurrences of words or
validate linguistic rules within a specific language territory. We obtain the most common word list from
http://oxforddictionaries.com/words/the-oec-facts-about-the-language
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cost is passed on to consumers cannot explain our findings either. In such a setting one would
expect all consumers to sort to cheap nonadvertising lenders.
Our second set of findings, in Section V, analyzes the content of advertisements. We show that a
significant share of advertisements explicitly advertise initial interest rates and that reset rates are
almost never advertised. Even advertised APR does not help consumers find cheaper lenders.
While mortgage advertisements disclose some information other than interest rates, this
information is rudimentary and generic, mainly about loan horizons or lending amount. We
found no evidence that lenders advertise their own characteristics, such as differences in
servicing or renegotiation practices.
Our results broadly reject the informative view of advertising in the mortgage market, favoring
the persuasive view instead. We now dig deeper into different models of these views and assess
how our results compare with specific empirical predictions of these models. Advertising can
basically take two forms. Firms can advertise prices, which translates to advertising explicit
interest rates in the mortgage context. Alternatively, they can advertise non-price features, such
as the type of products sold by the lender, the type of lender in general, or simply the existence
of the lender. We discuss theories that tie to these types of advertising in turn.
VI.A.1 Advertising interest rates
As Bagwell (2007) notes in his survey, market-level predictions of advertising models are
difficult to test. The correlation between advertising of firms and the average level of prices (or
dispersion of prices) across markets is difficult to estimate due to endogeneity problems (see
Glazer 1981). Moreover, different models frequently result in similar qualitative predictions at
the market level. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the cross-sectional correlation of prices
(interest rates) and advertising within a given market, which we find is positive.
An early model of informative price advertising is Butters (1977), in which sellers advertise
prices of their products. Consumers do not observe nonadvertising sellers, and their chances of
becoming aware of a seller increase with advertising. In equilibrium all firms advertise and also
randomize prices. Thus Butters (1977) predicts no correlation between the level of advertising
and prices. A similar lack of correlation between advertising and prices arises in Stahl (1994),
who extends Butters (1977) to allow for more general advertising and downward sloping demand
curves. 21 These predictions are in stark contrast to what we find in the data.
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Single unit demand is not an issue in the mortgage market, since consumers generally require one mortgage.
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In Robert and Stahl (1993) consumers engage in optimal search and firms choose advertising and
prices simultaneously. Advertisers randomize among low prices and advertise lower prices more
frequently; nonadvertisers charge high prices, and sell to consumers who have not seen an
advertisement with a lower price. This model demonstrates why informative models of price
advertising have a difficult time explaining our facts. Advertising a price is helpful only if the
price advertised is lower than other prices the consumer has observed; otherwise the consumer
will ignore the advertisement. The marginal benefit to advertising therefore decreases in price.
Therefore this model and similar models of informative advertising of prices lead to a negative
correlation between advertising and prices. This prediction is inconsistent with a positive
correlation between advertising and prices of firms within a market, which we observe in the
data.
Our analysis of advertised interest rates provides further evidence that is difficult to reconcile
with informative models of price advertising. In particular, the fundamental assumption
underlying informative models of price advertising that we discussed above is that advertised
prices perfectly inform a consumer about actual prices. Therefore a consumer following a lower
advertised price will purchase a cheaper product. We find that among firms who advertise, a
lower advertised APR does not lead borrowers to cheaper lenders. At best, the correlation of
advertised APR and lenders’ expensiveness is not correlated, and all estimated coefficients are
negative. This result violates the fundamental assumption that informative models are built upon.
The analysis of advertising content data also provides some guidance on which models might be
able to explain the nature of mortgage advertising. As we show, the initial rate features
frequently and prominently in mortgage advertisements, but the reset rate is almost always
omitted. Furthermore, the advertised APR, which is supposed to be the sufficient statistic for
borrowing costs, is uncorrelated (or negatively correlated) with the actual lender expensiveness.
The models that are more consistent with such advertising practices are those in which some
characteristics of goods -- in our case the reset rate -- are shrouded or not salient (Gabaix and
Laibson 2006; Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012). Advertising is used, instead, to increase
the salience of certain other characteristics -- the initial interest rate in the case of mortgage
advertising.
We also find that the positive correlation between advertising expensiveness and mortgage
pricing exists only for segments of borrowers who are more susceptible to manipulation because
these borrowers are potentially less informed. This lends support to models with heterogeneous
consumers, in which some consumers are more susceptible to biases or more confused than
others (Hall and Woodward 2012).
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VI.A.2 Non-price advertising
Non-price advertising to signal the interest rate
Informative advertising can occur in homogeneous goods markets even if firms do not explicitly
advertise prices. Firms can simply advertise their presence—consumers infer the price they
would be charged by firms based on the firm’s choice of whether and how much to advertise. As
we show, 15% of advertisements we analyze do not advertise any characteristics of a mortgage
or its interest rate. Bagwell and Ramey (1994) study a model in which consumers observe a level
of a firm’s advertising activity but do not observe its price until they incur a search cost—in
other words, consumers can respond to an advertisement by incurring the cost of contacting a
lender and only then do they learn the price. A rational consumer responds to such an
advertisement, because in equilibrium firms who advertise heavily also set low prices. If
intensive advertisers were to set high prices, then consumers would rationally not respond to
non-price advertising in equilibrium. Stores that advertise are compensated by large sales
volume, and stores that do not advertise earn the same profits through high prices but low sales
volume. Again, as in informative models of price advertising, this model also predicts a negative
correlation between advertising intensity and prices within a market, rather than the positive
correlation that we find in the data.
Advertising to match mortgages to borrowers
Another possible way for advertising to be useful to consumers is to inform them that the lender
sells mortgages that are differentiated in a way that matches the borrower’s preferences. The
theories formalizing this intuition require that lenders advertise mortgage characteristics, which
allow consumers to differentiate between lenders (Nelson 1964; Meurer and Stahl 1994;
Anderson and Renault 2006). Prima facie product differentiation is not a likely source of
variation in the market for securitized mortgages because securitization creates substantial
standardization in mortgages offered. But we can point to several more direct reasons that
suggest it is unlikely that product differentiation is the driver of our results.
First, note that we condition on a plethora of observable mortgage and consumer characteristics
when estimating our regressions. We find a positive correlation between advertising intensity
and mortgage prices conditioning on observable characteristics. As well, we use several
additional tests to show that unobservable characteristics of borrowers are also not likely to
explain our findings.
Second, and most importantly, as discussed in Section V.C, the mortgage characteristics that are
advertised are generic, such as mortgage horizon. Mortgages with these characteristics are
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offered by virtually all lenders in the market. We found no evidence of lenders advertising their
own characteristics, such as propensity to securitize or renegotiate. These results are difficult to
reconcile with the view that advertising language is used to inform about mortgage or lender
characteristics, that allow buyers to better match with a lender.
Finally, it is possible that while mortgage advertisers are not explicitly using language to
differentiate their product or practices, it is the intensity of advertising that allows borrowers to
draw inferences. We find a positive correlation between advertising intensity and mortgage
prices using within lender variation. Thus, it is unlikely that between-lender differences in
servicing, brand, or propensity to renegotiate are driving our results.
VI.B Related literature
In addition models of advertising, our paper is connected to several strands of literature. It is
related most directly to the recent literature on the causes and consequences of the financial crisis
(e.g., Agarwal et al. 2011; Barlevy and Fisher 2010; Ben-David 2011; Jiang et al. 2012; Keys et
al. 2009, 2010; Loutskina and Strahan 2011; Mayer and Pence 2009; Mayer et al. 2011; Mian
and Sufi 2009), and in particular to studies that examine the role of predatory lending in fueling
the crisis (see Agarwal et al. 2011). Our findings are consistent with those of Agarwal and
Evanoff (2013), whose data overlap with our sample period. They conclude that real estate
professionals steer higher-quality borrowers to lenders who offer unattractive terms. To the best
of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to identify an economically meaningful relation between
advertising and lending activity of subprime lenders.
Our paper is also related to the literature on firms’ responses to consumers’ limited ability to
process information and their biases (e.g., Malmendier and DellaVigna 2006). For example,
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Bordalo et al. (2012) study how consumers may focus on salient
product features. Stango and Zinman (2012) find that consumers are less likely to incur overdraft
fees after these are made salient, especially if consumers are financially less literate. 22 Our
findings are consistent with their view since we find the larger effect of advertising on mortgage
prices for less educated consumers.
Our paper also relates to the relatively nascent literature on the effects of limited attention on
financial outcomes. This literature argues that uninformed investors tend to ignore information
that is critical to firm value if it is not salient, and tend to respond more quickly to information
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Also related is work by Carlin and Manso (2011), who point out that educating customers might be ineffective,
because firms respond with further obfuscation.
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that catches their attention (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). 23 Similar to this work, we present
evidence that advertising decreases the well-being of agents who respond to it.
More broadly, our paper is related to literature on how persuasion affects consumer choices (see
Bagwell 2007, DellaVigna 2009, and DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010 for recent reviews).
Closest to our paper are studies that relate the use of advertising and pricing of homogeneous
products. Hastings, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2011) show that the use of advertising activity of
private social security funds in Mexico is related to their pricing. Bertrand et al. (2010) use a
field experiment to show that advertising increases demand for consumer loans and study the
effect of different advertising features. In this literature, our work is closely related to Agarwal
and Ambrose (2011), who assess the effect of advertising on choice of home equity debt
contracts by examining a direct mail advertising experiment done by a large bank. Their
evidence also supports the persuasive view of advertising in the mortgage market.
Our paper is also related to literature that examines effects of advertising on consumer
decisions. 24 In general, DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) point out that it is difficult to draw
causal interpretations because advertising is endogenous to several firm characteristics. Our
paper attempts to draw such a link by exploiting both the richness of our data and the analysis
that uses introduction of Craigslist.
VI.C Conclusion
Our analysis reveals that the major theories of informed price and non-price advertising have a
difficult time explaining the joint nature of advertising and pricing in the mortgage industry. The
models that are more consistent with the data are those in which some characteristics of goods, in
our case the reset rate, are shrouded/not salient (Gabaix and Laibson 2006; Bordalo, Gennaioli,
and Shleifer 2012), and advertising is used to increase the salience of certain other
characteristics, the initial interest rate in the case of mortgage advertising. We also find that the
positive correlation between advertising expensiveness and mortgage pricing exists only for
segments of borrowers who are more susceptible to manipulation because they are potentially
less informed. This evidence lends support to models with heterogeneous consumers, some of
whom are less susceptible to biases or less confused than others (Hall and Woodward 2012).
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Several other papers have used advertising as a measure of “attention-grabbing” events, which attract uninformed
investors. Grullon, Kanastas, and Weston (2004) show that advertising increases demand of uninformed investors
and Lou (2013) shows that firms use advertising to maximize the proceeds from insiders’ equity sales.
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Gurun and Butler (2012) present evidence that local newspapers slant their news in favor of firms with higher
local advertisement expenditures, which in turn increases investors’ demand for local stocks. Reuters and Zitzewitz
(2006) show that favorable advertisements in personal finance publications are positively correlated with mutual
fund recommendations and receive higher subsequent fund flows. Zinman and Zitzewitz (2012) demonstrate that ski
resorts engage in deceptive advertisement, which persists despite competition.
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We note that our paper is silent on why some lenders advertise and others do not, given that
advertising seems to be effective in attracting consumers who overpay for mortgages. One
potential reason is that we measure only the direct cost of advertising paid to the media, and do
not include other costs of advertising. It is possible that, after accounting for these costs,
advertisers do not earn excessive rents relative to nonadvertisers. Alternatively, lenders who
advertise could be earning rents, but it may take time for the competition to learn how to imitate
effective advertising. The precise channel remains an area for further research.
Our analysis focuses on the role that advertising plays in helping consumers choose the cheapest
mortgage from a set of mortgages. We do not explore whether advertising improves consumers’
choice of whether to take on a mortgage or select a more suitable mortgage product. The answer
to this question would require a benchmark specifying optimal mortgage choices for a given
consumer. Establishing such a benchmark to assess the informational role of advertising in
helping consumers choose among different types of mortgages requires more research.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
This table presents summary statistics of different datasets used in our analysis. Panel A reports the total
advertising expenditures in the top five DMAs between 2002 and 2006. Panels B and C present summary
statistics of ARM and FRM loans originated by banks over the sample period. Loan-specific attributes
include Reset Rate, Initial Interest Rate, Reset Time, loan-to-value ratio (LTV), Loan Amount, credit
score (FICO), Prepay Penalty Indicator, and Low Documentation Indicator. Panels B and C also
summarize demographic information of the areas where these loans were given (% Minority, Median
Household Income, % Poor, % Educated (college degree), % Female, and Average House Value).
Panel A. Total Advertising Expenditures in top five DMAs (2002–2006) (in thousands)
#
1
2
3
4
5

DMAs
Los Angeles
New York
San Francisco
Philadelphia
Chicago

Total
31,451
15,331
8,101
5,057
4,924

Newspaper
25,131
11,265
3,722
3,591
1,735

Spot TV
2,702
458
727
399
1,704

Outdoor
2,345
1,577
3,031
569
1,157

Panel B. ARM Loans
Reset Rate
Initial Interest Rate
Reset Time
LTV
Loan Amount
FICO
Prepay Penalty Indicator
Low Doc Indicator
% Minority
Median HH Income
% Poor
% Educated
% Female
Average House Value

Mean
8.59
7.8
28.24
84.68
168,601
626.02
0.77
0.4
25.74
47,241
10.86
14.99
51.08
147,978
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Std. Dev.
1.59
1.32
6.59
8.51
107,004
53.7
0.42
0.49
23.24
15,035
7.56
23.24
2.08
77,007

N
1,182,080
1,182,080
1,182,080
1,182,080
1,182,080
1,182,080
1,182,080
1,182,080
1,182,080
1,182,080
1,182,080
1,182,080
1,182,080
1,182,080

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (contd.)

Panel C. FRM Loans
LTV
Loan Amount
FICO
Prepay Penalty Indicator
Low Doc Indicator
% Minority
Median HH Income
% Poor
% Educated
% Female
Average House Value

Mean
91.55
104,228
640.39
0.59
0.38
25.02
48,096
10.87
15.37
51
153,438
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Std. Dev
11.77
101,500
50.82
0.49
0.48
22.61
15,582
7.65
0.08
2.09
81,787

N
464,530
464,530
464,530
464,530
464,530
464,530
464,530
464,530
464,530
464,530
464,530

Table 2. Measuring Mortgage Expensiveness
This table reports the estimation of the following specification: 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + Γ𝑋𝑖𝑙𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 ,
where i indexes the loan, j indexes the lender, t indexes the quarter, and l indexes the market. The
dependent variable is the reset rate on the ARM mortgage (first column) or the interest rate on the FRM
loan (second column). Low Doc is an indicator for loans that require low documentation at loan
application. Other controls include the demographic information for the zip codes in which the loans are
made (% nonwhite, median and mean household income, % poor, % female, % with BA degree, median
and mean house value). Standard errors are clustered by quarter and reported in parentheses under
coefficient estimates. (***), (**), and (*) denote statistical significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Initial Rate
Reset Time (x10)
LTV (x10)
Loan Amount (x10,000)
FICO (x100)
Prepay Penalty
Low Doc
Other Controls
Quarter Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Y=Reset Rate
[ARM Loans]
(1)
0.625***
(0.0615)
-0.206***
(0.0347)
0.109***
(0.0214)
-0.0055***
(0.0018)
-0.295***
(0.067)
0.196***
(0.029)
0.112***
(0.036)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,182,080
0.563
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Y = Interest Rate
[FRM Loans]
(2)

0.606***
(0.044)
-0.074***
(0.014)
-1.090***
(0.036)
-0.210***
(0.055)
0.406***
(0.052)
Yes
Yes
Yes
464,530
0.473

Table 3. Advertising and Expensiveness
In this table, we estimate the following specification: 𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + ε𝑗𝑙𝑡 ,
where the dependent variable measures how expensive mortgages are in a region from a lender. Lender
“expensiveness” is computed by aggregating individual loan level residuals obtained from specification
reported in Table 2. Advertising is the total dollar value of local advertising of lender j in market l in
quarter t. Panel A reports the coefficients using the ARM loan sample. Panel B reports the coefficients
using all mortgages. We compute expensiveness for all mortgages using residuals from the specification
estimated in column (1) of Table 2 for ARM loans and in column (2) of Table 2 for FRM loans. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates. (***), (**), and (*) denote statistical
significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Panel A. ARM Loan Sample

Advertising (all) (x100)
Advertising (others) (x100)
Advertising (newspapers)(x100)
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Y = Lender Expensiveness
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.0314**
(0.0115)
0.111
(0.082)
0.0368***
(0.0122)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
51,895
51,895
51,895
0.139
0.139
0.139

Panel B. All Mortgages

Advertising (all) (x100)
Advertising (others) (x100)
Advertising (newspapers) (x100)
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Y = Lender Expensiveness
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.0239**
(0.009)
0.089
(0.072)
0.0299***
(0.009)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
51,895
51,895
51,895
0.140
0.140
0.140
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Table 4. Advertising and Demographics
In this table we estimate the following specification: 𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + ε𝑗𝑙𝑡 , where the dependent variable measures how expensive
mortgages are in a region from a lender. Lender “expensiveness” is computed by aggregating individual loan level residuals obtained from the specification
reported in Table 2 using the ARM loan sample. Advertising is the total dollar value of local advertising of lender j in market l in quarter t. We split the
sample of lender/quarter/DMA observations by the share of loans weighted by the demographic characteristics of the area the loan was made in. High/Low
represent observations above/below the median of the characteristic. Educated is the percentage of households with a BA degree. Standard errors are clustered
by quarter and reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates. (***), (**), and (*) denote statistical significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Advertising (all) (x100)
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Minority %
Low
(1)
-0.046
(0.056)
Yes
Yes
Yes
25,922
0.150

Minority %
High
(2)
0.034***
(0.011)
Yes
Yes
Yes
25,973
0.158
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Y = Lender Expensiveness
Educated %
Educated %
Low
High
(3)
(4)
0.071***
0.006
(0.019)
(0.013)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
26,008
25,887
0.151
0.160

Poor %
Low
(5)
0.002
(0.019)
Yes
Yes
Yes
26,093
0.157

Poor %
High
(6)
0.037**
(0.013)
Yes
Yes
Yes
25,802
0.148

Table 5. Advertising and Delinquency
In this table, we estimate the following specification: 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 +
𝛼𝑙 + ε𝑗𝑙𝑡 , where the dependent variable is the percent of loans made by lender j in location l in quarter t
that turned out to be 90-day delinquent within the first two years of origination. Advertising is the total
dollar value of local advertising of lender j in market l in quarter t. Panel A reports the coefficients using
the ARM loan sample. Panel B reports the coefficients using all mortgages. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses under coefficient estimates. (***), (**), and (*) denote statistical significance for 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels.
Panel A. ARM Loans

Advertising (all) (x100)
Advertising (others) (x100)
Advertising (newspapers) (x100)
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Y= % of 90-day delinquent loans within 2 years of
origination
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.0025
(0.0027)
0.003
(0.014)
-0.003
(0.004)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
51,895
51,895
51,895
0.122
0.122
0.122

Panel B. All Mortgages

Advertising (all) (x100)
Advertising (others) (x100)
Advertising (newspapers) (x100)
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Y= % of 90-day delinquent loans within 2 years of
origination
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.002
(0.003)
0.004
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.003)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
51,895
51,895
51,895
0.134
0.134
0.134
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Table 6. Differences in Catering Costs
In this table we assess if costs (in dollars) such as application fees, underwriting fees, processing fees and
other fees borne during loan origination by a large subprime lender differs across various groups. In
Panels A and B we stratify borrowers by based on whether the borrowers are in a minority or not. In
Panels C and D we compare years in which the lender advertises versus when it does not. (***), (**), and
(*) denote statistical significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. a signifies that observations are reported for
the total fees column and vary for individual cost categories.
Panel A: ARM Loans

Non Minorities
Minorities
Difference
% Difference

Application
Fees

Underwriting
Fees

Processing
Fees

495
506
11***
2.2%

360
353
-7***
-2.0%

275
280
5***
1.8%

Total Fees
(excluding
interest rate)
1150
1144
-6***
-0.5%

Observationsa
398300
174496

Panel B: FRM Loans

Non Minorities
Minorities
Difference
% Difference

Application
Fees

Underwriting
Fees

Processing
Fees

Total Fees
(excluding
interest rate)

396
406
10***
2.5%

327
333
6***
1.8%

303
280
-23***
-8.2%

1052
1054
2***
0.2%

Observationsa
86413
28722

Panel C: ARM Loans
Application
Fees

Underwriting
Fees

Processing
Fees

Total Fees
(excluding
interest rate)

Non-advertising periods
Advertising periods
Difference

500
504
4***

360
355
-5***

279
277
-2***

1149
1145
-4***

% Difference

0.8%

-1.4%

-0.7%

-0.3%

Observationsa
346889
225907

Panel D: FRM Loans

Non-advertising periods
Advertising periods
Difference
% Difference

Application
Fees

Underwriting
Fees

Processing
Fees

Total Fees
(excluding
interest rate)

402
397
-5***
-1.3%

326
330
4***
1.2%

305
283
-22***
-7.8%

1053
1056
3***
0.3%
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Observationsa
41340
73795

Table 7. Craigslist Entry and Mortgage Advertising
In this table, we estimate the following specification using 2SLS: 𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 +
𝛼𝑙 + ε𝑗𝑙𝑡 , where the dependent variable measures how expensive mortgages are in a region from a lender.
Lender “expensiveness” is computed by aggregating individual loan level residuals obtained from
specification reported in Table 2. Advertising is the total dollar value of local advertising of lender j in
market l in quarter t. We use Craigslist entry to a region as an instrument in the first stage. Panel A reports
the results of the first stage estimation for different measures of advertising (Total, Other, and
Newspaper) using the following specification: 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 +
𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + ν𝑗𝑙𝑡 . After Craigslist Entry is a dummy variable indicating the presence of Craigslist in a given
location l in period t. Panel B reports the coefficients of the second stage using the ARM loan sample.
Panel B reports the coefficients of the second stage using the ARM loan sample omitting lenders who
advertised on Craigslist. Panel D reports the coefficients of the second stage using all mortgages.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates. (***), (**), and (*) denote
statistical significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A. First Stage -- Craigslist entry

After Craigslist Entry
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations

Total
Advertising
(1)
-1.217***
(0.247)
Yes
Yes
Yes
51,895

Y= Advertising
Other
Newspaper
Advertising
Advertising
(2)
(3)
-0.321***
-0.764***
(0.079)
(0.170)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
51,895
51,895

Panel B. Second Stage -- Instrumented Advertising (ARM Loan Sample)

Advertising (all)
Advertising (others)
Advertising (newspapers)
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations

Y= Lender Expensiveness
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.072***
(0.018)
0.271***
(0.087)
0.114***
(0.027)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
51,895
51,895
51,895
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Table 7. Craigslist Entry and Mortgage Advertising (contd.)
Panel C. Second Stage -- Instrumented Advertising (ARM Loan Sample)
(Subsample removing lenders who directly advertised on Craigslist)

Advertising (all)
Advertising (others)
Advertising (newspapers)
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations

Y= Lender Expensiveness
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.078***
(0.019)
0.274***
(0.087)
0.131***
(0.031)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
50,902
50,902
50,902

Panel D: Second Stage – Instrumented Advertising (All Mortgages)

Advertising (all)
Advertising (others)
Advertising (newspapers)
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations

Y= Lender Expensiveness
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.068***
(0.016)
0.256***
(0.082)
0.108***
(0.024)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
51,895
51,895
51,895
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Table 8. Craigslist Entry and Timing
In this table, we explore the timing of Craigslist entry in a region and advertising and characteristics of lending in that region. Advertising is the
total dollar value of local advertising of lender j in market l in quarter t. We use the following specification
𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑙𝑡 = ∑2𝑘=−2 𝛽𝑖 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑘 𝑙 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + υ𝑗𝑙𝑡 , where After Craig List Entry is a dummy variable indicating the
presence of Craigslist in a given location l. k indicates the quarters before, during or after Craigslist entry in a location. k>=+2 indicates all the
periods two quarters after Craigslist entry. The omitted category is the presence of Craigslist two quarters before it enters a location. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates. (***), (**), and (*) denote statistical significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

After Craigslist Entry -2
After Craigslist Entry -1
After Craigslist Entry 0
After Craigslist Entry +1
After Craigslist Entry >=+2
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Total
Adv.
(1)
-0.146
(0.179)
-0.512**
(0.183)
-0.796***
(0.269)
-0.925***
(0.190)
-1.646***
(0.286)
Yes
Yes
Yes
42,632
0.114

Y=Advertising
Other
Adv.
(2)
0.0151
(0.097)
-0.118
(0.068)
-0.219**
(0.100)
-0.184**
(0.075)
-0.413***
(0.115)
Yes
Yes
Yes
42,632
0.204

Newspaper
Adv.
(3)
-0.169
(0.099)
-0.361***
(0.123)
-0.499***
(0.151)
-0.660***
(0.118)
-1.088***
(0.199)

(4)
1.274
(0.827)
-0.538
(1.033)
0.580
(0.769)
0.076
(0.802)
0.260
(0.864)

Y=Observables
Prepay
LTV
Penalty
(5)
(6)
-0.0240
0.013
(0.120)
(0.008)
0.274
0.010
(0.164)
(0.011)
0.231**
0.029**
(0.107)
(0.011)
0.106
0.021**
(0.124)
(0.008)
0.043
0.044***
(0.150)
(0.012)

Yes
Yes
Yes
42,632
0.087

Yes
Yes
Yes
42,632
0.292

Yes
Yes
Yes
42,632
0.233
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FICO

Yes
Yes
Yes
42,632
0.574

Low Doc.
(7)
-0.004
(0.008)
-0.012
(0.007)
-0.017**
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.009)
-0.015***
(0.005)
Yes
Yes
Yes
42,632
0.298

Table 9. Analyzing Advertising Content
This table presents summary statistics on the content of print and direct mail advertising campaigns. In Panel A, we use textual analysis to identify
the existence of ARM loan related search terms in mortgage advertising campaigns. Search terms include “ARM”, “Reset”, “Adjust” Panel B
presents analysis using advertisements where two interest rates were advertised. Panel C identifies mortgages that may promote such as low
interest rates (e.g. “AS LOW AS”, “INTRO*”, “INITIAL”, and “STARTING”). In Panel D, tabulate the quantitative information disclosed in
these campaigns. “No numerical information” refers to campaigns that do mention an actual number. Explicit interest rate refers to campaigns that
mention a specific interest rate. “Below - in reference to a Prime Rate” refers to campaigns that convey information about interest rate and
reference to the prime interest rate offered to high FICO mortgage borrowers. “Dollar Amount” refers to advertising campaigns that mention a
dollar amount in reference to a down payment requirement. “Horizon” refers to advertising campaigns that mention a specific loan maturity.
Finally, “No information” refers to advertising campaigns that do not contain any information on mortgage type (e.g. does not contain terms such
as “ARM”, “RESET”, “ADJUST), interest rate (e.g. does not refer to a specific interest rate or contains terms like “AS LOW AS”, “INTRO*”,
“INITIAL”, “STARTING”, “THEREAFTER”) or non-price features (e.g. mentioning a horizon (MONTH or YEAR), down payment requirement,
or loan purpose (“FHA”, “CONSOLI*” or “REFIN*”).
Panel A. ARM Mortgage Related Advertising Campaigns
No. Campaigns
4,238
13
1,885
4234
6,136

Search Term
ARM
Reset
Adjust
Explicit interest rate
Total

Panel B. Advertisement Displays Two Interest Rates
No. Campaigns
11,387
1,676
128
13,191

Search Term
Second rate is APR
Multiple products
Other
Total
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Table 9. Analyzing Advertising Content (contd.)
Panel C. Phrases on Low Rates
No. Campaigns
3,632
769
346
608
4,747

Search Term
As low as
Intro
Initial
Starting
Total

Panel D. Quantitative Mortgage Information
Search Term
No Numerical Information
Explicit interest rate
APR stated
Below (in reference to a Prime Rate)
Dollar Amount
Horizon (Year, Month)
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No. Campaigns
6,563
26,863
20,146
969
16,702
21,992

Table 10. APR and Expensiveness
In this table we estimate the following specification: 𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝛽𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 + 𝛼𝑗 + ε𝑗𝑙𝑡 , where the dependent variable measures how expensive
mortgages are in a region from a lender. Lender “expensiveness” is computed by aggregating individual loan level residuals obtained from the
specification reported in Table 2 using the ARM loan sample. APR is the advertised APR of lender j in market l in quarter t. Controls are whether
the advertisement advertised a mortgage horizon, the reset horizon, mentioned a below prime initial rate and a count of the terms in the
advertisement. Standard errors are clustered by lender and reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates. (***), (**), and (*) denote
statistical significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

APR
Controls
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

(1)
-0.0205**
(0.009)
No
Yes
No
No
807
0.222
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Y = Lender Expensiveness
(2)
(3)
-0.0258**
-0.0105
(0.013)
(0.009)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
807
807
0.230
0.421

(4)
-0.0093
(0.015)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
807
0.598

Appendix: Table A1 -- Robustness to Alternative Expensiveness Measures
In Panel A, we estimate the specifications presented in Table 3 (Panel A, Column 1 [baseline
specification]) for alternative measures of expensiveness instead of the ones obtained from Table
2. The first two columns compute expensiveness by estimating 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 = 𝑃𝑛 (𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑙𝑡 ) + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙 +
ε𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 , where 𝑃𝑛 designates a polynomial of order n. Column 1 is estimated with second degree
polynomials (with all interactions).and column 2 is estimated with and third degree polynomials
(with all interactions). In column 3 we estimate separate regression presented in Table 2 for
subsamples formed on deciles of the initial interest rate, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡 , and in column 4 we form 20
subsamples cut in 5 percentile increments. In Panel B we estimate the specifications presented in
Table 5 (Panel B, Column 1 [baseline IV specification]) using these alternative measures of
expensiveness. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates. (***),
(**), and (*) denote statistical significance for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A: Baseline Specification

Advertising (all) (x100)
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Y = Lender Expensiveness
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.033***
0.033***
0.022**
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.010)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
51,895
51,895
51,895
0.135
0.131
0.133

(4)
0.023**
(0.010)
Yes
Yes
Yes
51,895
0.132

Panel B: Baseline IV

Advertising (all) (x100)
Quarter Fixed Effects
Lender Fixed Effects
Region Fixed Effects
Observations

Y = Lender Expensiveness
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.062***
0.056***
0.042***
(0.016)
(0.015)
(0.012)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
51,895
51,895
51,895
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(4)
0.041***
(0.012)
Yes
Yes
Yes
51,895

Appendix: Table A2 -- Mortgage Classifieds on Craigslist
The data contains information collected from Craigslist financial services using monthly snapshots kept by
Wayback Machine (2002 to 2006). The number of snapshots throughout the sample is the number of
monthly observations per location. The average number of postings listed in a given snapshot is the average
number of postings in the financial services section in a given location. The percentage of posts containing
terms “Mortgage” or (“Loan” and “Home”) is the share of posts containing terms “Mortgage,” or
containing terms “Loan” and “Home” in the same post.
Percentage of posts
containing terms

Market
Athens, GA
Atlanta, GA
Austin, TX
Baltimore, MD
Buffalo, NY
Urbana, IL
Chicago, IL
Cincinnati, OH
Cleveland, OH
Dallas, TX
Denver, CO
Detroit, MI
Honolulu, HI
Houston, TX
Las Vegas, NV
Los Angeles, CA
Miami, FL
Minneapolis, MN
Nashville, TN
New Orleans, LA
New York, NY
Philadelphia, PA
Phoenix, AZ
Pittsburg, PA
San Diego, CA
Seattle, WA
San Francisco, CA

Number of
snapshots
throughout the
sample
7
35
32
29
22
14
34
20
30
37
34
29
30
34
37
35
32
22
24
24
38
33
34
22
36
34
13

Average
“Mortgage” or
number of
(“Loan” and
posts per
“Home”)
snapshot
9.3
72.4
5.4
231.2
7.8
104.8
9.0
104.5
9.6
75.2
11.8
46.7
7.4
134.3
8.7
83.5
10.3
79.4
5.0
166.5
9.4
94.3
11.4
73.8
9.3
76.6
7.1
122.8
5.8
182.1
4.8
168.3
10.9
113.0
8.1
123.0
10.6
75.5
7.2
76.6
6.0
182.6
7.6
124.9
7.4
152.2
12.3
80.4
8.3
109.1
10.7
89.8
6.7
380.5
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“Mortgage”
7.5
4.4
6.1
7.9
8.6
10.5
6.3
7.4
8.1
3.9
7.5
9.6
7.6
5.6
4.5
3.6
9.1
6.9
9.4
5.6
5.5
6.4
5.7
10.8
6.3
8.0
5.5

Appendix: Table A3 -- Top Fifty Words Used in Mortgage Print and Direct Mail Advertisements
In this table we present 50 most popular words used in mortgage print and direct mail advertisements. We eliminate the most common words in
English as defined by Oxford English Corpus, words referring to a price (APR, Rate, Fixed, ARM, Prime, Dollar, Amount, Variable, Interest),
words referring to a time period (Month, Year, Term), and words that exist in almost all advertisements (Mortgage, Loan, Payments)
#
Word
1
LOW
2
OPPORTUNITY
3
USED
4
HOME
5
BASED
6
CREDIT
7
REFINANCE
8
AMOUNTS
9
LOWER
10
LINE
11 HOMEOWNERS
12 CONSOLIDATE
13
CURRENTLY
14
DEBT
15
CUSTOMERS
16
CASH
17 IMPROVEMENTS
18
PAY
19
OFF
20
MORE
21
ABILITY
22
PURPOSE
23
MINUS
24
DEBTS
25
EQUITY

Occurrence
14968
11503
7646
7616
6276
5003
4905
4756
4395
4344
4170
3775
3711
3709
3685
3658
3501
3344
2862
2696
2679
2606
2588
2309
2234

%
1.144%
0.879%
0.584%
0.582%
0.480%
0.382%
0.375%
0.364%
0.336%
0.332%
0.319%
0.289%
0.284%
0.284%
0.282%
0.280%
0.268%
0.256%
0.219%
0.206%
0.205%
0.199%
0.198%
0.176%
0.171%

#
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
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Word
PREAPPROVED
ADJUSTABLE
THEREAFTER
REDUCE
CURRENT
REPAYMENT
EXISTING
BORROWERS
BILLS
INTRODUCTORY
LINES
PURCHASE
CHANCE
SAVE
BELOW
INFORMATION
HELP
HIGH
EXPENSES
LIFE
CAR
RANGING
MEMBERS
PREQUALIFIED
CONSOLIDATION

Occurrence
2141
2002
1969
1969
1890
1847
1677
1633
1513
1421
1340
1237
1221
1214
1169
1038
1026
1012
944
943
936
926
877
876
874

%
0.164%
0.153%
0.151%
0.151%
0.144%
0.141%
0.128%
0.125%
0.116%
0.109%
0.102%
0.095%
0.093%
0.093%
0.089%
0.079%
0.078%
0.077%
0.072%
0.072%
0.072%
0.071%
0.067%
0.067%
0.067%

Figure 1. Evolution of Mortgage Advertising over Time
This figure plots the time series of advertising expenditures for the matched lenders over the sample period. Figure 1(a) plots the total advertising
expenditures and the expenditures in the three outlets over the sample period by our sample of lenders. Figure 1(b) provides the time series
evolution of the percent advertising expenditures by the three dominant channels used by lenders in our sample.
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Figure 2. Geographic Distribution of DMA level Advertising of Mortgage Lenders
This map displays the spatial distribution of DMA level advertising expenditure by mortgage lenders in the 206 DMAs across the U. S over our
sample period. We use four colors to represent the total advertising expenditure over our sample period in a given DMA (yellow signifies DMAs
for which we do not have advertising information). Advertising numbers in legend are represented in thousands.
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Figure 3: Kernel Density of Residuals
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Figure 3(a) plots the kernel density of residual ARM reset rate a borrower was charged. The reset rate residuals are computed from the regression
presented in Column 1 of Table 2. Figure 3(b) plots the kernel density of residual interest rate a borrower was charged. The plotted residuals are
the combined ARM and FRM residuals from regressions presented in Column 1 and 2 of Table 2.
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Figure 4: Kernel Density of Dispersion within Region and within a Quarter
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Figure 4(a) plots the kernel density of difference in mortgage expensiveness between the 95th and 5th percentiles in a given DMA in a given
quarter. Expensiveness of a loan is defined as the residual ARM reset rate that a borrower was charged relative to the reset rate paid by an average
borrower with the same set of observable characteristics, the same initial interest rate, in the same region and the same quarter (the residual from
Column 1, Table 2, averaged within lender quarter DMA). Figure 4(b) shows the kernel density of differences between the 95th and 5th
percentiles of lender expensiveness in a given location and quarter. Lender expensiveness is computed as the average the expensiveness of
individual loans for this lender in that location and quarter (combined residuals from Columns 1 and 2, Table 2, averaged within lender quarter
DMA).
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Figure 5: Kernel Density Plot of Residual Reset ARM Rates for Advertisers and Nonadvertisers
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This figure plots the kernel density of residual ARM reset rate a borrower was charged. The residual is computed for the borrower as the reset rate
paid by the borrower relative to the reset rate of the average borrower with the same set of observable characteristics, the same initial interest rate,
in the same region and the same quarter. We plot the kernel density for lenders who advertise, defined as those with positive advertising spending
in a given quarter and DMA and for lenders who do not advertise, defined as those with no advertising spending in a given quarter and DMA.
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3

Figure 6. Timeline of Craigslist Entry
This figure plots the time line of the introduction of Craigslist across various states in the United States, starting in 1999 till 2008.
(Source: http://www.craigslist.org/about/expansion)

Craigslist Penetration
Nashville, Charlotte,
Cincinnati, Columbus
Albuquerque, Anchorage,
Buffalo, Memphis, Salt Lake,
Santa Barbara
Sacramento
Atlanta, Austin, Denver
San Francisco

1999

Miami, Minneapolis,
Philadelphia, Phoenix

Baton Rouge, Mobile,
Montgomery

2002
Chicago, LA, New York,
Portland, San Diego,
Washington
Boston

Champaign, Charleston SC,
Chico, Dayton, Delaware

2005

Dallas, Detroit, Houston,
London, Toronto

2008
Springfield, Rockford,
Springfield IL, Columbia,
Rockfort
Little Rock, Madison, Maine

Albany, Orange County,
Spokane, Tucson, Tulsa
Baltimore, Cleveland, Las
Vegas, New Orleans,
Pittsburgh, Raleigh, St. Louis
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Figure 7. Kernel Density Plot of Residual Reset ARM Rates Pre- and Post-Craigslist for Advertisers and Nonadvertisers
This figure plots the kernel density of residual ARM reset rate a borrower was charged. The residual is computed for the borrower as the reset rate
paid by the borrower relative to reset rate of the average borrower with the same set of observable characteristics, the same initial interest rate, in
the same region and the same quarter. We plot the kernel density for lenders who advertise, defined as those with positive advertising spending in
a given quarter and DMA and for lenders who do not advertise, defined as those with no advertising spending in a given quarter and DMA. In
addition, we plot the distributions separately for the period before Craigslist entry in a given location and for the period after Craigslist entry.
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Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Amit Seru
University of Chicago Booth School of Business
5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
amit.seru@chicagobooth.edu
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